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A Wire Request in the Executive Director's Voice: What FBI Fraud Figures and a Nonprofit Study Mean for the Association Finance Desk

FBI complaint data on business email compromise, what AI changes in a payment request, what a university study of small nonprofits found, and three checks the people who release payments can run.

Operations Finance Fraud Security Research

A message that seems to come from the executive director asks accounts payable to send a payment today, or a long-time supplier writes to say its bank details have changed. The FBI files that kind of request under business email compromise, and the FBI’s 2025 IC3 Report lists $3,046,598,558 in business email compromise losses reported for 2025, a figure drawn from complaints filed by businesses and individuals. On AI, the same IC3 report says: “In 2025, businesses reported losses over $30 million to BEC scams involving AI.” It also says “there are multiple BEC tactics, and not all are AI-enabled,” so the AI figure is one part of the reported losses, not an explanation for them.

We read the FBI’s annual complaint report and its alerts on this kind of fraud, a university study of small nonprofits and a nonprofit risk newsletter. No source has measured this fraud at associations. None of them tested whether a given check lowers losses, so the moves at the end rest on guidance rather than measured results.

How the FBI definition finds an association’s payables desk

The IC3 report defines the scam in one sentence: “BEC is a scam targeting businesses or individuals working with suppliers and/or businesses regularly performing wire transfer payments.” An association that pays suppliers and sends wires meets that description at any size. The definition also reaches past the inbox to “phone numbers and virtual meeting applications,” which matters for a staff member who takes instructions by call or video.

The people in that line are whoever releases payments (accounts payable, the controller or finance director) and whoever relays a leader’s instructions, often an executive assistant. IC3’s complaint counts show 24,768 business email compromise complaints from businesses and individuals in 2025, and the report ranks these losses second only to investment fraud. Those are complaints as filed, not a survey of organizations.

What generative AI changes in the request itself

According to the IC3 report’s section on AI, chat generators “can quickly create official-sounding emails mimicking a company’s CEO or other officials,” and voice cloning “can also be used to request wire payment.” A December 2024 FBI alert on generative AI adds that criminals generate video “for real time video chats with alleged company executives,” and that the tools “can correct for human errors that might otherwise serve as warning signs of fraud.” A May 2025 FBI alert about impersonated officials says cloned and real voices “can sound nearly identical” and that AI-generated content “is often difficult to identify.”

Read together, these passages suggest that the old tells (clumsy grammar, an unfamiliar voice, a camera that stays off) are weaker than they were. A familiar face on a call is no longer proof of who sent the instruction. The check has to sit in how a payment gets approved, not in a staff member’s ear for something that sounds off.

What a university study of small nonprofits found

A UC Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity study from April 2026, done with the Washington state IT agency, surveyed 100 nonprofits, over half of them employing fewer than 20 full-time employees. They are small Washington nonprofits, not associations, and the study does not ask about AI. Even so, it found phishing and business email compromise were the two most common attacks those nonprofits faced. Of the nonprofits in the Washington survey that reported an attack, 34 percent reported operational disruptions. The authors conclude that nonprofit security plans should treat phishing, business email compromise and financial fraud as the primary threats.

The study’s case narratives lay out the setup. Nonprofits the researchers interviewed reported transmitting purchase orders and invoices, bank routing and account details by email. In one case, attackers who had read vendor-payment emails spoofed a trusted vendor’s address through typosquatting and asked to update its banking information. In the researchers’ account of that single case, the nonprofit transferred a $300,000 payment to the fraudulent account. The fraud came to light only when the real vendor reported that the payment had not arrived. In another, hackers set email filters that sent all bank alerts to the trash. Some organizations recovered stolen funds by contacting their banks, and others could not reverse the loss.

Three checks for whoever releases the money

Confirm bank-detail changes somewhere other than the message. The FBI’s September 2024 alert on business email compromise, written for businesses, says: “Use secondary channels and/or two-factor authentication to verify requests for changes in account information.” Put that step at the point where a payee’s details are edited, before the change is saved. The Nonprofit Risk Management Center’s summer 2026 newsletter gives nonprofits matching advice: “If the request came by email, reach out to the purported sender by phone or another means to confirm they sent the message.” The May 2025 alert, written for the public about a campaign impersonating senior US officials, tells people who get such messages to “independently identify a phone number for the person and call to verify their authenticity.”

Read the address and the link before the tone. Because generative AI can clean up the wording, the sender’s address carries more weight than the prose. The same September 2024 alert tells businesses to “Ensure the URL in emails is associated with the business/individual it claims to be from,” to “Be alert to hyperlinks that may contain misspellings of the actual domain name,” and to “Verify the email address used to send emails, especially when using a mobile or handheld device”. A typosquatted vendor domain, like the one in the Washington case, is the kind of misspelling that check is meant to catch. The check has a limit, though. The Berkeley study notes that “Once attackers gain access to an email account, they can review past communications to identify financial processes,” and a message sent from a real but compromised mailbox passes every address test. That is why bank-detail changes go through the first check as well.

Know the first hour after a bad transfer. The IC3 report’s guidance for 2025 is short enough to tape inside the payables binder:

The September 2024 alert adds that “it is important to know what assistance your financial institution will provide when attempting to recover funds,” so ask the bank that question before anything goes wrong. Filing matters as well: the IC3 report says that in the past most Financial Fraud Kill Chain incidents opened by its Recovery Asset Team were business email compromise cases, and the September 2024 alert says “The FBI IC3 may be able to assist both the financial institutions and law enforcement in freezing funds.”

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